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July 26, 2005

Ch.IV. Q. 23. Common Consent

BELIEF in the existence of God is practically as widespread as the race, although it is often found in perverted and grotesque forms and buried beneath superstitious ideas. Such exceptions as exist can be accounted for, and are of a nature to prove the rule.1

2. Two sorts of men are mentioned as not acknowledging the existence of the Supreme Being, viz., certain savage races, and certain avowed Atheists. Whatever may be the case with the former,2 they are so abnormally degraded as to lack many other ideas which rational men commonly possess. The latter are interested in denying the existence of God.

3. This common consent can only be accounted for in four ways: (a) by natural necessity of such a belief to one constituted as man is;3 (b) by the strength of the evidence furnished through the common experiences of men; (c) by primitive tradition;4 (d) by repeated supernatural revelations.

4. The fact of common consent shows the onus probandi to be with the Atheist rather than with the Theist.5 The Atheist is under the logical necessity of shifting this burden, either by showing that the consent has an illegitimate basis, or by proving that God does not exist. And, since the bare possibility that such a moral Sovereign as God exists, puts us to a moral probation,6 no one ought to accept the atheistic conclusion until the non-existence of God has been demonstrated beyond doubt. Such demonstration requires universal induction. In short an Atheist should be practically omniscient, lest some indication of God's existence should escape his notice.7

5. It is, however, desirable to exhibit the argument for the existence of God for three reasons, (a) to convince genuine seekers after God; (b) to strengthen the faith of believers; (c) to enrich our knowledge of the nature of God.


1 Flint, Theism, App. note viii.; Staley, Nat. Religion, pp. 63-72; Stanton, Place of Authority, pp. 56-63; Pearson, De Deo, ii., pp. 16, 17; Liddon, Some Elements, pp. 48, 49; Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories, Lec. vii. and App. notes xxvi.-xxxii.; Illingworth, Personality, pp. 81, 249-251; Blackie, Atheism, pp. 5-16.

2 Tylor, Prim. Culture, Vol. I., pp. 377, 381, 418; Staley, pp. 72-73.

3 Calderwood, Philos. of Infin., pp. 47-48.

4 Flint, Theism, App. note iv.

5 Mason, Faith of the Gospel, ch. i., § 3.

6 Butler, Analogy, Introd.; Romanes, Thoughts on Religion, pp. 144, 151, 152.

7 Chalmers, Nat. Theol., Vol. I, Bk. I., ch. 2; Flint, Anti-Theistic Theories, pp. 8-14, 446-450; Christlieb, Modern Doubt, pp. 143, 144.

Posted by Debra Bullock at July 26, 2005 07:48 PM

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