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July 26, 2005
Ch.IV. Q.24. Ontological Argument
THE Ontological argument, which was first formulated by St. Anselm, proceeds as follows: "I have in my mind the idea of the most perfect being conceivable. The most perfect being conceivable must have the attribute of necessary existence. One whose existence was contingent would not be the most perfect conceivable. Necessary existence implies actual existence. An absolutely perfect Being, therefore, actually exists, and He is God."1
2. St. Thomas rejects the argument for the following reasons: (a) It does not appeal to all, for some regard God as a body—not as the greatest Being conceivable; (b) It begs the question, for the necessity of thinking that the most perfect conceivable Being exists is not equivalent to the fact of His existence, nor a demonstration of it.2 To these objections may be added the further difficulty, that our most perfect conception falls short of the Infinite Being whose existence we desire to prove.3
3. Descartes undertook to employ this argument, but was forced by the exigencies of controversy to adopt an a posteriori form.4 Many attempts at a priori proof were also made in the eighteenth century.5
4. A priori proof is formally imperfect; but the attempt to employ it brings to light in a forcible manner (a) the naturalness of our belief in the existence of God; (b) the fact that we must either believe that God exists or else regard the fundamental conditions of human thinking as delusive. The latter alternative is equivalent to an assertion of universal insanity, which would preclude the possibility of any science whatever.6
1 Norris, Rudiments, p. 18; St. Anselm, Proslogium, ch. 2; Illingworth, Personality, pp. 100-103, 257-260; Flint, Theism, Lec. ix., esp. pp. 278-280; Fisher, Grounds of Belief, pp. 26, 27; Liddon, Some Elements, pp. 49-51; E. Caird, in Journal of Theol. Studies, Oct. 1899.
2 St. Thos., Summa, I. ii. 1; Bowen, Mod. Philos., p. 27; Mulford, Repub. of God, pp. 1-5; Waterland, Dissert. on Argument a Priori, Works, Vol. III., pp. 321 et seq.
3 Flint, p. 280.
4 Given in Q. xxv., below.
5 Flint, App. xxxviii.
6 Flint, pp. 285-288; Caird, Philos. of Religion, ch. v.; Moberly, Reason and Religion, pp. 141, 142; Calderwood, Philos. of Infin., pp. 51-56; Gratry, Knowl. of God, Pt. I., ch. v.
Posted by Debra Bullock at July 26, 2005 08:44 PM
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