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July 27, 2005
Ch.IV. Q.27. Teleological Argument
THE teleological argument starts with the evidences of design observable in the universe, and infers a Designer of sufficient intelligence and wisdom to account for them. An intelligible world is readily understood to be, "thought realized," and this means that there has been forethought, and a Fore-thinker.1
2. The facts with which this argument starts are: (a) The general prevalence of order and adjustment, as of means to ends; (b) the unity of nature, as seen in the coincidence and co-operation of physical causes to the production of single results, and in the general harmony of the ends to which all parts of nature are adapted; (c) the progress of natural development towards a "far-off Divine event, to which the whole creation moves."
3. The evolutionary hypothesis strengthens this argument, since it describes nature as developing according to intelligible and therefore intelligent methods. These methods indicate a plan, and point to an intelligent cause. If it be urged that undesigned variations and a survival of the fittest account for all, the reply is that a scheme of variations which by natural survival causes a cosmos, and its advance towards a rational goal, cannot be the result of accident.2
4. Kant raised two objections in his Critique of Pure Reason, (a) the argument proves the existence of an architect or fashioner of nature, but not a Creator of its its [sic] material elements. This is true, but all the argument pretends to prove is that the First Cause is intelligent. None the less, it appears probable that He is also the Creator of matter, although for other reasons. Matter cannot be separated from those properties which constitute its adaptability. Its origination appears to coincide with its adaptation. Moreover, the principle of design is not satisfied except by hypothecating a Designer who is not Himself designed. But a designer who is not the ultimate cause must have been designed. We cannot rationally divorce the Cause of all from the Designer of all.3
5. (b) An Infinite Creator cannot be inferred, strictly speaking, from finite creation, however great and wonderful. All that can be insisted upon is a being of inconceivably great power and wisdom. This is also true, but infinity seems to be involved in the idea of an undesigned and, therefore, uncaused Designer, who has the grounds of His intelligence in Himself.4
6. The alternative of Design is Chance. Lucretius held that the world is the result of a "fortuitious concourse of atoms." But one might as reasonably believe that a haphazard collection of small metallic pieces could, by mere accident, fall on some paper in such wise as to print this volume.5
1 Fisher, Grounds of Belief, pp. 29-55; Paley, Nat. Theol., opening chaps.; Flint, Theism, Lecs. v., vi.; MacColl, Christianity in Relation to Science, pp. 17-21; Mozley, Essays, pp. 363-413; St. Thos., Summa, I., ii., 3 quinta; Profeit, Creation of Matter; Turton, Truth of Christianity, Bk. I., ch. iii.; Illingworth, Personality, pp. 93-100, 255-257. Cf. Psa. xciv. 9, 10.
2 Fisher, pp. 45-55; Profeit, ch. x.; Temple, Bamp. Lecs., Lec. iv.; Flint, pp. 189-209, 390-394; Row, Theism, ch. vi.; Moore, Science and the Faith, pp. 186-200; Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, pp. 203 et seq.; Fiske, Idea of God, pp. 118 et seq. and Through Nature to God, pp. 109 et seq.; Jevons, Evolution, ch. xii, xiii.; Martineau, Religion, Vol. I., pp. xv.-xix.; Fairbairn, Philos. Of the Christian Religion, ch. i., §§ iii., iv.; Iverach, Theism, Lecs. i.-iv.; Illingworth, pp. 94-99.
3 Flint, pp. 170-173; Profeit, ch. xi.; Fisher, p. 42.
4 Flint, pp. 174-177; Fisher, p. 42.
5 MacColl, Christianity in Rel. to Science, p. 19; Fisher, pp. 43-45.
Posted by Debra Bullock at July 27, 2005 11:07 PM
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