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July 27, 2005
Ch.IV. Q.26. Cosmological Argument
THE Cosmological argument proceeds from the phenomena of the universe and their harmony to an Infinite First Cause to account for them.1 "Finite things have not their origin in themselves. We trace effects back to their causes; but these causes are found to be, also, effects.2 The path is endless. There is no goal. There is no satisfaction, save in the assumption of being that is causative without being caused, or being which has its ground of existence in itself." This argument does not require us to retrace causation ad infinitum, as is sometimes alleged. The point is that the idea of causation cannot be satisfied by unending regression, but only by a cause that is not itself caused — which terminates the regressive series of links in causation.3
2. The nearest approximation to a true cause which we directly observe is our own will. Mere sequence, or mere force, does not satisfy the idea of a cause; which involves, apparently, a choice of effects to be produced. Thus we are led to hypothecate will in the cause of all things.4 Moreover, while we may not argue by mere analogy from the nature of effects to a like nature in their cause, we seem to be driven to the conclusion that no impersonal cause is adequate to account for the production of a world containing persons, such as human beings are. Their cause must be personal and free.5 The teleological argument serves to complete and confirm this conclusion.
3. The cosmological argument does not of itself prove that the cause of the universe is infinite. But when we analyze the idea of a cause which is itself uncaused, and has the grounds of its being in itself, we seem to see that such a cause must be self-determinate and unlimited by anything external to itself. This answers to the idea of an infinite Being.6
4. Two premises are assumed: (a) that phenomenal events require causality; (b) that the world is not itself eternal and therefore not self-caused. The former would seem to be axiomatic, but Hume objected that we cannot observe causality. What we actually see is succession. Yes, but we intuitively recognize the difference between mere succession and the succession of cause and effect, and the reality of causality accounts for this discrimination more satisfactorily than any other hypothesis.7
5. The other premise is disputed by the Pantheist, who regards the universe as self-caused and eternal. But, while it is impossible to demonstrate directly the falsity of such a contention, the following considerations militate against its truth: (a) All history, comparative philology, and ethnology indicate that the human race is of recent origin; (b) the evidences of development in nature and of dissipation of heat point back to a beginning of the present order;8 (c) the pantheistic hypothesis does not account satisfactorily for the existence of persons in the universe; and it possesses certain moral difficulties, considered elsewhere.9
1 Flint, Theism, Lec. iv.; Row, Theism, ch. iv.; Calderwood, Philos. of Infin., ch. vii.; Liddon, Some Elements, pp. 51-53; St. Thos., Summa, I., ii. 3; Hodge, Outlines, pp. 33-35; Illingworth, Personality, pp. 84-93, 251-255.
2 Flint, pp. 118-124.
3 Fisher, Grounds of Belief, pp. 27, 28; Illingworth, pp. 87-88.
4 Martineau, Religion, Vol. I., pp. 131 et seq.; Vol. II., pp. 227-248; Ward, Philos. of Theism, Essay ix.; Fraser, Philos. of Theism, pp. 190-192; Fisher, pp. 28-29; Illingworth, pp. 86-87; Romanes, Thoughts on Religion, pp. 124-126.
5 Steenstra, Being of God, pp. 31-33; Flint, pp. 129-130.
6 St. Thos., I., vii. 1; Perrone, Praelec. Pt. II., cap. iii., Prop. 2; Jackson, Works, Vol. V., pp. 16-33; Schouppe, Elementa, Tract v., § 110; Calderwood, pp. 383-384.
7 Steenstra, pp. 36-38; Mozley, Essays, pp. 415-444; Flint, pp. 97-101.
8 Chalmers, Nat. Theol., I., v.; Flint, pp. 101-118; Mason, Faith of the Gospel, ch. I., § iv.
9 Steenstra, pp. 43-45.
Posted by Debra Bullock at July 27, 2005 11:05 PM
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